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Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has been tacitly pressing ahead with an ambitious vision to 
reshape public administration. The main purpose of 
this advance is to foolproof the Russian state against 
the drawbacks of the heavy-handed top–down mode of 
governance of late Putinism, and to squeeze as much as 
possible out of the stagnant Russian state while avoid-
ing any fundamental change.
The Meta-Reform: The Government’s 
Coordination Center
“I think he will start with reforming public administra-
tion [gosupravlenie],” said Sberbank’s German Gref on 
16 January 2020, one day after Mishustin was appointed 
prime minister. While Mishustin is best known for the 
digital transformation of Russia’s tax service, his vision 
as PM is more ambitious: Mishustin did indeed launch 
an administrative reform the scope of which is only com-
parable to the one initiated in 2003–2004. A so-called 
“Coordination Center” was created on 22 February 2021, 
and can be considered the centerpiece of this reform. It 
is attached to the government’s in-house think tank, the 
Analytical Center, and is headed by Deputy PM Dmi-
try Chernyshenko.
The idea goes back to 2015 when President Vladimir 
Putin tasked Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev with 
designing a specialized “project office”. The philosophy 
behind this obscure “office” has been most clearly laid 
out by Sberbank’s German Gref, who can be consid-
ered the founding father of what would later become 
the Coordination Center.
Gref ’s view might be summarized as follows: The 
state of Russia’s economy is rotten. But before any mean-
ingful reforms can be launched, the quality and capacity 
of the state’s public administration should be enhanced, 
ideally with the help of big business: agile project man-
agement, performance measurement, and of course dig-
ital transformation. This meta-reform therefore would 
need to tackle the vertical governance style characteris-
tic of the Russian state. And the archaic top–down sys-
tem would have to be replaced by modern public man-
agement practices such as performance management.
Gref is famous for having become infatuated with 
PEMANDU, the “Performance Management and Deliv-
ery Unit” formed in 2009 to monitor Malaysia’s “Gov-
ernment Transformation Program”. On 30 June 2016, 
Putin created the Presidential Council on Strategic 
Development and Priority Projects, essentially a coor-
dination and monitoring group for the 2012 May dec-
rees. Presidential aide Andrei Belousov was, as the main 
watchdog for the implementation of the 2012 May dec-
rees, appointed secretary of the Council. In parallel, 
a department for project management was created 
within the PM’s executive office [Apparat Pravitel’stva].
Even though there were major issues with the imple-
mentation of the 2012 May Decrees, they were to a large 
degree repackaged into the 2018 National Projects, and 
with the reappointment of the Medvedev government 
after the 2018 presidential elections, the previous man-
agement structure of the May Decrees was mostly kept 
intact. The reactivation of the State Council did not help 
much to improve feedback mechanisms between the 
center and the regions: in some spheres, such as salaries 
for certain categories of state employees, most regions 
even rolled back and fell behind the 2018 targets.
The reason why the Medvedev government had 
to step down simultaneously on 15 January 2020 has 
largely remained in the dark. Medvedev had been 
increasingly seen as a hindrance for meta-reforming 
the Russian state: with the National Projects, Russia 
had its answer to the Malaysian Government Transfor-
mation Program in place, but a functioning “delivery 
office” and performance management was largely absent. 
While PEMANDU promised “big, fast results,” Med-
vedev played it small and slow.
The main question, of course, is whether Mishus-
tin’s elevation is simply yet another restructuring of the 
executive without changing the bigger picture. Mishus-
tin at least appears to be motivated to act “big and fast”.
First, the federal executive will be shrunk by about 
32,000 staff units, with cuts at the center of up to 5 per-
cent and in the regions of up to 10 percent of staff (mostly 
by cutting currently vacant positions). By contrast, the 
PM’s office is being expanded to 1.792 staff. More impor-
tantly, the PM’s office should move away from merely 
servicing 61 government commissions and focus on 
policy work instead: the PM’s office now mirrors the 
Cabinet of Ministers, which should bolster its capabil-
ity to coordinate policy and solve impasses. The restruc-
turing of Russia’s sprawling 40 development institu-
tions, some of them under the roof of Igor Shuvalov’s 
VEB (such as Skolkovo and Rosnano), should also be 
seen in this context: while six of them will be liquidated 
altogether, the functions of the others are meant to be 
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restructured in order to facilitate coordinated implemen-
tation of national development goals. Part of this reform 
is not only an audit of key performance indicators for 
the various developmental organizations and state cor-
porations, but also cuts to staff, salaries and privileges.
Second, the Coordination Council is not a subordi-
nate unit within the PM’s office as the project depart-
ment was, but rather a task force in its own right directly 
under Deputy PM Chernyshenko. The statute defines 
three main functions: incident management, priority 
tasks, and special projects. Moreover, decisions by the 
Center are obligatory for all federal executive bodies. In 
short, the Coordination Council will become the gov-
ernment’s main troubleshooter. Last year, a predecessor 
task force had to solve “incidents” relating to bonus pay-
ment arrears for doctors working with Covid-19 patients, 
the provision of hot meals to pupils and the liquida-
tion of deficits with certain drugs. Among the priority 
tasks, for example, is the coordination of government 
support for Russia’s nine most economically depressed 
regions. The main idea behind the Center is to alleviate 
the drawbacks of top–down governance with more hor-
izontal project-based work across executive officials and 
agencies. All of this should help to create an analytical 
ecosystem that supersedes the usual information bar-
riers between vertically organized ministries and exe-
cutive agencies.
Mishustin’s “Social Networks” and Russia’s 
Data-Driven Authoritarianism
One of the main challenges to making the Coordina-
tion Council work is “digital feudalism,” the more than 
800 information systems within the executive with little 
compatibility and the bureaucrats who collect and insert 
(often manipulated) data into these systems. The pro-
posed solution relates to the “state as platform” idea pro-
posed by Aleksei Kudrin’s Center for Strategic Develop-
ment (CSR): such a data-driven state would serve as the 
main integrator for seamless communication between 
citizens, business and state executive bodies. But so far, 
data, Russia’s “new oil,” remains “dirty oil”: In 2019, 
the government approved the National System for Data 
Management (NSUD) to synchronize hundreds of state 
databases and create unified rules for the collection, 
manipulation, storage and usage of this data. How-
ever, regional pilot projects have exposed major issues 
with coordination among executive bodies with func-
tional overlap.
Much more successful is the public services platform 
Gosuslugi, which reached 126 million users by the end 
of 2020, with 24 million having registered in that year 
alone. Around 70 million Russians are verified users of 
the Unified System for Identification and Authentica-
tion (ESIA) and are therefore entitled to use e-govern-
ment services fully online via Gosuslugi. By linking ver-
ified Gosuslugi user profiles with the manifold state data 
bases in a unified data structure including between 20 
and 60 categories of data on citizens, a “Digital Citizen 
Profile” will increasingly allow the Russian government 
to facilitate seamless data flows between the state, cit-
izens and business (first and foremost banks). This will 
create abundant opportunities for citizen surveillance. 
But the Coordination Center is as the government’s in-
house think tank also called upon to improve feedback 
mechanisms with the population; to this end, the plat-
form Gosuslugi—Reshaem Vmeste (Let’s decide together) 
is being introduced in all federal subjects. Linking cit-
izen complaints to e-government services in this way 
does not only create an early-warning system for citizen 
grievances, but is also a useful addition to the Krem-
lin’s Centers for Regional Management (TsUR), which 
collect complaints about regional authorities on social 
media. Research shows that this kind of digital par-
ticipatory governance is likely to increase votes for the 
incumbent.
Increased presidential powers in the wake of the 
2020 constitutional changes exacerbate the “bad gov-
ernance” associated with overcentralization and person-
alist rule. In the run-up to the long electoral cycle of the 
2021 Duma elections and the 2024 presidential elec-
tions, Mishustin’s administrative tweaks are intended 
to counterbalance the governance risks that accompany 
the zeroing of Putin’s presidential terms.
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